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This study addresses whether asset securitizations are really asset sales or a form of 
secured borrowing, by estimating cross-sectional equity valuation regressions to assess whether 
the stock market treats securitized assets and liabilities held by a special purpose entity (SPE) as 
assets and liabilities of the sponsor-originator (S-O).  Overall, we find that the market views the 
SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O, i.e., the risk and rewards of ownership of the 
transferred assets reside with the S-O and not the SPE.  Results from a boot-strapping simulation 
that controls for scale by randomly assigning SPE assets and liabilities from one S-O to another 
provide evidence that scale bias is an unlikely explanation for finding the market views SPE 
assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O.  Findings from specifications in which we permit 
coefficients to differ for S-O firms with high and low relative levels of retained interest indicate 
that whereas the market views asset securitizations by low retained interest S-O firms as sales, 
i.e., risk transfer has taken place, it views asset securitizations by high retained interest S-O firms 
as secured borrowings, i.e., risk transfer is incomplete.  We also show that although the market 
views securitizations by regulated and unregulated S-Os as secured borrowing, there is 
suggestive evidence that regulated firms have greater incentives to use securitizations to achieve 
off-balance sheet financing. 
.
 1. Introduction 
Asset securitizations have become a large source of corporate financing.  By the end of 
the third quarter of 2003, the asset securitization market was valued at $6.8 trillion, making it 
second in size only to U.S. treasuries, which were valued at $7.1 trillion (Bond Market 
Association, 2004).  Asset securitizations enable a firm to obtain cash for assets transferred to 
another entity.  In a typical securitization, the so-called sponsor-originator (S-O) sets up a special 
purpose entity (SPE), which borrows funds from a third party to purchase the securitized assets 
from the S-O.  The SPE’s borrowing is usually at an investment grade rate because the S-O 
guarantees in some form some or all of the debt issued by the SPE.  If various conditions 
(described below) are met, the S-O removes the securitized asset from its balance sheet and 
records a sale.  The collapse of Enron, a frequent user (and abuser) of securitizations, focused the 
attention of securities regulators, accounting standard setters, and the media on whether 
accounting recognition and disclosure requirements for securitizations were adequate for 
investors to understand the economic costs and benefits of the securitization transaction on the S-
O.  In particular, a key question is whether asset securitizations are really asset sales or a form of 
secured borrowing.1 
In response to the Enron accounting crisis, a Congressional committee asked the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prepare a report to address accounting issues 
relating to off-balance sheet activities (SEC, 2005).  Although by Congressional mandate the 
report focuses on asset securitizations and special purpose entities, the SEC report broadens the 
scope to include a number of transactions that receive degrees of off-balance sheet treatment, 
including pensions and leases.  The key issue relating to these transactions are indeed similar to 
                                                 
1 Bond rating agencies, including Moody’s Investors Service (2002) have expressed concern that accounting for 
asset securitizations that permit sale accounting treatment results in financial statements that present a misleading 
picture of the credit strength of companies. 
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those relating to asset securitizations, in particular whether risks and rewards of ownership have 
been transferred from the firm to its employees and retirees (pensions) or to a lessee (leases).  
The pension question has been studied by Landsman (1986), employing a research design we 
adapt to our present study. 
The primary research question we address is whether the stock market treats securitized 
assets and liabilities held by an SPE as assets and liabilities of the S-O.  We do so by estimating 
cross-sectional equity valuation models for a sample of 297 S-O firm-year observations 
representing 112 firms that disclose securitization information in their financial statements in 
2000-2004.  The key valuation model is one that includes measures of the S-O’s assets and 
liabilities, estimates of the SPE’s assets and liabilities, and S-O income.  This analysis requires 
us to restate the S-O’s assets, liabilities, and income as if no sale had taken place, i.e., as if the 
SPE’s operating activities are consolidated with those of the S-O.  If the market views the SPE as 
a truly separate entity, then its assets and liabilities will not be priced in such a valuation 
equation.  If the converse is true, the SPE assets and liabilities will be priced as if they belong to 
the S-O.  We find that the market views the SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O, 
i.e., the risk and rewards of ownership of the transferred assets reside with the S-O and not the 
SPE.  To ensure our results are not an artifact of scale, we conduct a boot-strapping simulation 
that controls for scale by randomly assigning size-adjusted SPE assets and liabilities from one S-
O to another.  Evidence from the simulations suggests that scale bias is an unlikely explanation 
for finding the market views SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O.  
A second research question we address is whether the amount of “retained interest” 
arising from its securitization transactions affects the market’s perception of the degree to which 
risk has been transferred to the SPE.  Retained interest is a common means by which bankruptcy 
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of the SPE is made a remote prospect, and it therefore serves the function of a guarantee.  
Consistent with predictions we develop, we find that the market views securitization transactions 
by S-O firms with relatively high and low amounts of retained interest differently.  In particular, 
whereas the market views asset securitizations by low retained interest S-O firms as sales, i.e., 
risk transfer has taken place, it views asset securitizations by high retained interest S-O firms as 
secured borrowings, i.e., risk transfer is incomplete. 
We also find that although the market views securitizations by regulated and unregulated 
S-Os as secured borrowing, there is suggestive evidence that regulated firms have greater 
incentives to use securitizations to achieve off-balance sheet financing. 
Our study adds to the small, growing body of research examining accounting issues 
relating to asset securitizations.  Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2004) and Shakespeare 
(2004) address questions regarding whether managers engage in asset securitizations partly to 
manage reported earnings.  A study more closely related to ours by Nui and Richardson (2004) 
shows that off-balance sheet debt related to asset securitizations has the same risk relevance as 
recognized debt for explaining market measures of risk (i.e., CAPM beta).  Our study 
complements Nui and Richardson (2004) by showing the market values SPE debt similarly to 
recognized S-O debt.  However, our study provides a more comprehensive picture by showing 
that SPE assets also are valued by the market similarly to recognized S-O assets. 
To motivate our study, we begin by developing an economic theory of why firms use 
securitizations in lieu of other forms of debt financing.  The principle conclusion from this 
analysis is that securitizations enable firms to mitigate bankruptcy costs associated with other 
forms of direct borrowing.  We also show that regulated financial firms have additional costs that 
are mitigated by achieving off-balance status for their borrowings. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background 
information concerning asset securitization, including a description of the salient institutional 
features and the accounting requirements.  Section 3 discusses the economic theory of asset 
securitizations, which is the basis for our empirical tests that are described in section 4.  Section 
5 describes our data and sample and how we consolidate the SPE and S-O to create accounting 
amounts needed for our estimations and tests.  Section 6 presents the findings, and section 7 
presents a summary and concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
In a typical securitization transaction, an S-O transfers a cash flow stream generated by a 
pool of financial assets such as mortgages, loans, and leases to an SPE.  The SPE finances the 
transfer by borrowing from financial institutions and other outside investors.  These lenders are 
repaid by the SPE from the cash flows generated by the securitized financial assets.  The S-O 
usually retains a portion of the pool of securitized financial assets, which is commonly referred 
to as the retained interest.  If certain conditions described below are met, then the transfer of 
assets from the S-O to the SPE can be treated as a “sale” by the S-O for accounting purposes.  In 
addition, if additional conditions are met, then the SPE’s balance sheet is not consolidated with 
that of the S-O, permitting the S-O to achieve off-balance sheet financing. 
The rules governing accounting for asset securitizations in the US are provided in 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 (FASB, 2000; hereafter SFAS 140).  
SFAS 140 requires the firm to record the transaction as a sale if the S-O meets certain conditions 
relating to whether it is deemed to have relinquished control over the assets.  First, the S-O 
unequivocally transfers legal title to the assets to the SPE, i.e., the assets have been isolated from 
the S-O in the case of bankruptcy.  Second, SFAS 140 does not allow the S-O to enter an explicit 
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agreement to buy back non-performing assets.2  Third, the SPE must be free to pledge or 
exchange the assets.  If these and other sale accounting treatment conditions are met, the S-O 
removes the securitized assets from its balance sheet and recognizes a gain or loss on the sale. 
A related issue is whether the SPE’s activities must be consolidated with those of the S-
O.  During our sample period, the US accounting rules governing this issue were comprised of 
conditions stated in paragraph 35 of SFAS 140 and a series of pronouncements from the 
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) and views expressed by key SEC staff.  These guidelines 
include a requirement that the SPE finance the transfer by issuing equity equal to at least 3% of 
the value of the total claims.  If this and other requirements were not met, then the S-O was 
required to consolidate the SPE.  This, of course, would effectively undo the sale accounting and 
bring back the transferred assets and the associated debt issued by the SPE onto the consolidated 
balance sheet. 
Prior to SFAS No. 140, few companies provided details on their securitizations.  After 
the issuance of SFAS 140, effective January 2000, S-Os are required to disclose separately, 
among other details, the total principal amount of financial assets that the S-O manages that have 
previously been securitized and continues to be involved with, gains from securitizations during 
the year, and the book value of any retained interests. 
In the period following the collapse of Enron, in the US the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) issued guidelines for implementing SFAS 140, including Financial 
Interpretation No. 46 (Revised), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (FASB, 2003; 
hereafter FIN 46R).  FIN 46R focuses on more formally codifying the rules defining effective 
                                                 
2 SFAS 140 does allow S-O firms to repurchase certain assets through either calls or removal of account provisions 
(paragraphs 51-54 and 85-88).  However, the repurchase ability is extremely limited.  If the provisions give the S-O 
effective control over the transferred assets, then sale accounting is disallowed. 
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control that were previously covered by SEC and EITF pronouncements.3  Presently, the FASB 
and the International Accounting Standards Board are together deliberating changes to financial 
reporting requirements for accounting for asset securitizations.  The data used in the present 
study are unaffected by these ongoing developments. 
3. Theoretical Analysis 
 To answer the accounting question of when it is appropriate for accounting purposes to 
treat a securitization as a sale and when it should viewed as secured borrowing it is necessary to 
examine the motives for securitization.  Securitization is a form of financial intermediation.  As 
with many issues in financial economics, it is useful to start from the perspective of a Miller-
Modigliani (M&M) world in which firms can borrow and lend without incurring transaction 
costs or costs associated with financial default.  In such a setting, firms with complex debt 
structures created to tap different debt clienteles would simply be shifting risks from one class of 
debt-holder to another.  At the margin, financial transactions would create no value for the 
stockholders.  In a costless M&M world, the only value created by debt financing is that it can 
reduce the firm’s tax obligations.  Aside from potential tax benefits, it is unclear how 
securitization adds value, particularly as the overall effect of the transactions tends to accelerate 
rather than delay the recognition of income.  However, it is even less clear in an M&M world 
why the accounting treatment should have any economic consequences. 
 Moving away from the M&M world, the demand for securitization stems from two 
sources.  One is to provide a means of using a portfolio of risky assets to support the issuance of 
debt to institutions and other investors who require the securities they hold to be of investment 
grade, i.e., to meet the market’s demand for relatively low risk debt.  The other, more subtle, 
                                                 
3 However, there is an explicit exception for securitization transactions, in which SPE is considered a qualifying SPE 
under SFAS 140.   
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reason can be traced to the possibility that bankruptcy costs caused by attempts by debtholders to 
upset predetermined priorities in bankruptcy.  In the US, Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code 
certainly makes this possible.  Securitization is a means to lower both costs.  How these 
objectives can be met can be understood by briefly considering the securitization process. 
 As noted above, the S-O typically sets up an SPE that purchases part of the S-O’s assets, 
or even undertakes originating transactions itself, and finances these transactions by issuing 
asset-backed debt instruments.  The portfolio of assets to be used as security for the SPE’s debts 
must be transferred from the S-O to the SPE in such a way that the courts will accept that a “true 
sale” has taken place in the event of the bankruptcy of the S-O.4  A true sale creates a fire wall 
between the claims of debtholders in the S-O and debtholders in the SPE by making it difficult 
for the S-O’s debtholders to seek recourse to the assets transferred to the SPE.5  The fire wall is 
the means of assuring the debtholders of the SPE that their claims will not be diluted by the 
claims of the S-O’s debtholders.6  The creation of such a fire wall is straightforward if the assets 
are exchanged for cash on a non-recourse basis: the portfolio of transferred risky assets will have 
been replaced by cash, leaving the S-O’s debtholders with no reasonable grounds for complaint 
(assuming the transaction is at fair value). 
The complication arises that the securitization must be done in a way that makes 
bankruptcy of the SPE a remote prospect.7  As already noted, one reason for securitization is for 
the S-O to issue investment grade securities by protecting the SPE’s debtholders from dilution 
                                                 
4 To achieve this in practice, the S-O obtains a true sale opinion from a lawyer stating that the SPE is bankrupt-
remote from the S-O. 
5 There does not appear to be any case law directly addressing whether a contested securitization transaction is a true 
sale or a secured financing.  The Chapter 11 bankruptcy of LTV Steel appears to be the first occasion in which a 
securitization structure has been unwound by the court and the decision subsequently challenged by an SPE creditor.  
For further details, see Stark (2002). 
6 Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire (2006) arrives at the more general insight that the corporation exists as a 
business structure not only to limit the liability of stockholders, but also to protect the claims of the corporation’s 
debtholders from being diluted by claimants of the stockholders’ personal creditors. 
7 For further analysis of how this might be achieved, see Gorton and Souleles (2004). 
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from the S-O’s other creditors.  An additional reason for setting up a bankruptcy-remote vehicle 
is that it will nearly always be the case that the transferred assets will be used as collateral for 
issuing different tranches of debt to suit the differing asset portfolio needs of investors.8  The 
different tranches will have different priorities of claims, with the attendant possibility of costly 
legal proceedings in the event of default.9  The SPE must therefore be set up in a manner that 
minimizes the possibility of such disputes.  This can be done in a variety of ways.  One way is to 
over-collateralize the debt of the SPE.  Over-collateralization is equivalent to substituting equity 
for debt financing, with the attendant cost of foregone tax shields.  Another is to offer some form 
of guarantee, either explicit or implicit.  However, when offering a guarantee, it is critical not to 
put the sale at risk of being deemed a loan by the courts; otherwise, the securitization would also 
be at risk.10  True sale status of the asset transfer will not be jeopardized by a loan guarantee that 
is provided by a genuine third party.  More typically, the S-O provides the bulk of the credit 
enhancements.11  This can take the form of the S-O providing the SPE with standby letters of 
credit.  However, because standby letters of credit work only to smooth out fluctuations in the 
SPE’s cash flows, it can at best only be a partial solution to the risk borne by the SPE’s creditors. 
A particularly important and common form of credit enhancement is for the S-O to 
purchase the most junior securities issued.  These junior securities are often referred to as the 
equity tranche, or the “toxic waste”.  This retained interest acts as a guarantee in the sense that 
                                                 
8 Tranching is the process of transforming the risk-return profiles and credit risk exposures of an asset pool into 
different risk classes with differing seniority in bankruptcy and timing of default. 
9 This problem could be avoided if the transferred assets could be broken up into different pools, each of which is 
assigned to a different SPE, with each pool of assets being used to back the issuance of a single homogeneous type 
of debt instrument.  Legal squabbles over priority in the event of default would be avoided.  However, splitting up 
the assets into legally distinct pools could be prohibitively costly or impossible.  For example, it is not obvious how 
the S-O could split the cash flows of a portfolio of bonds into interest and principal and place each in different fire-
walled entities. 
10 In addition, if the S-O agrees to buy back non-performing assets, the S-O will not qualify for sale accounting. 
11 A primary reason why third party credit enhancement is uncommon is that information asymmetry prevents the 
third party from being willing to offer such guarantees except at a prohibitively high cost.  Of course, such a cost 
would reduce the incentive to use asset securitization as a means to issue debt. 
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the S-O absorbs much of the SPE’s risk.  The larger the retained interest, the larger the risk borne 
by the S-O, the more remote the prospect of the SPE defaulting, but the greater the risk that a 
court might query whether a true sale had taken place (Stark, 2002, p. 218).  The S-O therefore 
has to make a tradeoff between the costs associated with the bankruptcies of the two entities.  
 The key empirical matter this paper investigates is whether the accounting for 
securitization transactions covered by SFAS 140 properly reflects the underlying economics of 
the transactions.  From an accounting perspective, such transactions involve removal of the 
securitized assets from the S-O’s balance sheet and, if additional considerations described above 
are met, non-consolidation of the SPE’s debt with that of the S-O.  From an economic 
perspective, an economic true sale occurs if the risks and rewards associated with the transferred 
assets and the debt issued by the SPE reside fully with the SPE or a third party.  Because retained 
interest acts as a guarantee for the SPE’s creditors, the risk transfer is incomplete.  As noted 
above, the larger the retained interest, the larger the risk borne by the S-O.  Below, we address 
the question whether the market views the typical securitization transaction as a sale (risk 
transfer) or as a secured borrowing (little or no risk transfer) by estimating cross-sectional 
valuation regressions.  In addition, we also examine whether the amount of retained interest 
affects the market’s perception of the amount of risk transfer. 
It is important to recognize that our analysis does not assume that securitization 
transactions are motivated by a desire to manage earnings.12  Rather, the objective is to place a 
fire wall around the assets that are to be used as collateral for the securities issued by the SPE.  It 
is essential that the courts would recognize any transfer of assets from the S-O to the SPE as a 
                                                 
12 See Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2004) and Shakespeare (2004) for further discussion and empirical 
evidence.  Banks and other financial institutions subject to regulatory capital requirements are particularly likely to 
be affected by the desire to engage in securitizations to manage not just earnings but also regulatory capital.  See 
section 6.4 below. 
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genuine sale to maintain ex post the ex ante priorities between the different debt securities of the 
two entities.  From this perspective, the accounting treatment matters if and only if the choice of 
treatment influences the judgment of the court about the status of the sale in the event of a 
subsequent dispute.13  The existence of recourse arrangements can play a part here as well.  It is 
an open issue whether continuing involvement of the S-O in the financial affairs of the SPE in 
the form of a retained interest would affect the court’s judgment about the status of the sale.  We 
assume market participants take account of such uncertainties when valuing the S-O’s stock.  In 
particular, when assessing how retained interest affects the value of the S-O’s stock, market 
participants have to judge not only whether and to what degree the S-O will absorb the financial 
risk stemming from the SPE’s assets, but also the court’s position on whether a true sale has 
occurred and therefore whether the S-O’s creditors have claim to the SPE’s assets in the event of 
the S-O’s bankruptcy.  Although we take into account the amount of retained interest in some of 
our regressions, we have no way to disentangle the degree to which each of the two judgments 
separately is reflected in the valuation of the S-O’s stock.  Nonetheless, we expect the greater is 
the retained interest, the less risk transfer is likely to have taken place.  
4. Empirical Design 
4.1 Estimating Equations for the Typical Sponsor-Originator 
 The study’s primary research question is whether the market views asset securitization 
transactions as sales or a form of implicit borrowing by the S-O.  The question can be rephrased 
as whether economically the risks and rewards associated with the transferred assets and the debt 
issued by the SPE reside with the S-O or the SPE.  We address this question by estimating a 
                                                 
13 “Although not dispositive, courts have examined the transaction agreements for evidence of intent.  How the 
originator accounted for the transfer on its books and records may be probative” (Stark, 2002, p. 219). 
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cross-sectional valuation model similar to that used by Landsman (1986).  That study addresses a 
different but economically similar research question, i.e., whether the market views defined 
benefit pension plan assets and obligations as assets of the sponsoring firm or whether the risks 
and rewards of pension activity are transferred to the firm’s employees and retirees.  Following 
the vast empirical literature based on the insights of Ohlson (1995), our estimating equations 
differ from Landsman (1986) in that they include a measure of earnings.  All regressions are 
estimated using per share amounts. 
 We begin by estimating a benchmark regression, given by equation (1), for the S-O firms, 
without consideration of SPE assets and liabilities, i.e., before consolidation. 
ititititit eNIaLIABaASSETaaMVE ++++= 3210 ,    (1) 
where MVE is equity market value, ASSET and LIAB are book value of total assets and liabilities, 
and NI is net income, all measured on a per share basis.  ASSET and LIAB are measured at fiscal 
year end, MVE is measured three months after the fiscal year end, and the i and t subscripts 
denote firm and year respectively.  Based on prior research, we predict 11 =a , 12 −=a , and 
03 >a . 
 The next model we estimate, equation (2), consolidates the S-O and SPE balance sheets.14 
ititititit eNIADJaLIABNEWaASSETSNEWaaMVE ++++= ___ 3210   (2) 
NEW_ASSET and NEW_LIAB are total assets and liabilities on a consolidated basis.15  In 
particular, NEW_ASSETS equals the S-O assets, ASSET, minus the sum of retained interests, 
RET_INT, and servicing rights, MSR, plus the SPE’s assets, SPE_ASSET.  We define 
SPE_ASSET as managed loans disclosed in the financial statements.  We consider two alternative 
                                                 
14 See section 5.2 for a description of the consolidation procedure. 
15 For ease of exposition, we use the same notation for coefficients and error terms for each of the estimating 
equations.  In all likelihood they differ across equations. 
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measures for NEW_LIAB: NEW_LIAB_HIGH and NEW_LIAB_LOW.  NEW_LIAB_HIGH equals 
S-O liabilities, LIAB, plus SPE_ASSET.  Thus, NEW_LIAB_HIGH represents an extreme case 
which presumes that the SPE is capitalized solely with debt.  NEW_LIAB_LOW equals 
NEW_LIAB_HIGH minus the sum of RET_INT and MSR.  As described in section 5.2, 
NEW_LIAB_LOW represents a partial adjustment to reflect the capital retained by the S-O.  
Finally, ADJ_NI is the S-O’s net income less gains (losses) from current year securitization 
activities, and it is therefore an income measure reflecting consolidation. 
Equation (2) addresses the question whether the market views the typical asset 
securitization as a partial or complete risk transfer.  In particular, it makes no distinction between 
those S-O firms that utilize a relatively high proportion of retained interest and those that use a 
relative low proportion.  As with equation (1), if the market views the SPE’s assets and liabilities 
as belonging to the S-O, we predict 11 =a , 12 −=a , and 03 >a .  However, if the market views the 
securitization transactions as being partial or complete risk transfers—with a complete transfer 
being economically equivalent to sales—then we predict 11 <a and 12 −>a  as the coefficients 
will reflect the average valuation effects of the S-O’s recognized assets and liabilities and the 
SPE’s assets and liabilities that do not fully belong to the S-O. 
 To test the main hypothesis whether the market views the typical asset securitization 
economically as a sale or secured borrowing, we decompose NEW_ASSET and NEW_LIAB into 
their primary components, permitting the components to have different coefficients.  Equation 










3210   (3) 
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ADJ_ASSET and LIAB are, respectively, NEW_ASSET less SPE_ASSET and NEW_LIAB less 
SPE_LIAB.  Our predictions are as follows.  If the market views the typical asset securitization as 
a sale, then 3a  = 4a  = 0.  On the other hand, if the market views securitized assets and liabilities 
as assets and liabilities of the typical S-O, then 3a  = 1a and 4a  = 2a .  An intermediate case is also 
possible, whereby the market views the typical securitization as representing a partial risk 
transfer, for which we predict 031 >− aa  and 024 >− aa . 
4.2 Random assignments of SPE assets and liabilities 
A common concern with cross-sectional valuation models stated in levels is correlated omitted 
variable bias, in particular scale bias (Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Easton and Sommers, 2003).  Of 
particular concern in our study is that SPE assets and liabilities could appear to be priced as S-O 
assets and liabilities because of the effects of scale.  To address this concern, we conduct the 
following randomization test.  In particular, we randomly assign SPE assets and liabilities 
associated with a particular S-O as belonging to another S-O, scaling up (or down) the magnitude 
of the randomly assigned SPE assets and liabilities based on relative size – equity market value – 
of the “recipient” S-O and the “donor” S-O.  We then estimate equation (3) using the randomly 
assigned SPE assets and liabilities, and repeat this procedure 1,000 times.  If scale is the cause of 
3a  and 4a  differing from zero when estimating equation (3) using actual data, then the mean 
coefficients from this bootstrapping procedure should look similar to those based on actual data 
and the bootstrapped 3a  and 4a  coefficients should consistently differ from zero.  On the other 
hand, if scale has little effect on 3a  and 4a  estimated using actual data and there is no underlying 
relation between SPE assets and liabilities and S-O equity market value, then the mean 3a  and 
4a  coefficients from the bootstrapping procedure will be zero. 
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4.3 Estimating Equations partitioning on Retained Interest 
As explained in section 3, retained interest is a common feature of securitization 
transactions. Retained interest effectively represents an equity stake in the SPE by the S-O, and 
thereby acts as a guarantee for the SPE’s creditors.  The risk transfer is incomplete: the larger is 
the amount of retained interest, the larger the risk borne by the S-O.  To assess whether the 
valuation effects of SPE assets and liabilities differ depending on the amount of retained interest, 
we estimate equation (3) separately for “high” and “low” retained interest S-Os.  We classify 
firms as being high (low) retained interest S-O firms with retained interest above (below) the 
median amount of retained interest as a proportion of S-O total assets, i.e., RET_INT/ASSETS.  
We predict that high retained interest S-O firms will be valued as if there is less risk transfer than 
for the low retained interest firms.  That is we predict 3a  ( 4a ) for high retained interest S-O 
firms is larger (smaller, i.e., more negative) than 3a  ( 4a ) for low retained interest S-O firms.  In 
the extreme, the market will value high (low) retained interest firms as if no (full) risk transfer 
occurs, i.e., 3a  = 1a and 4a  = 2a  ( 3a  = 4a  = 0). 
In principle, a classification scheme more consistent with the theory of risk transfer is one 
based on retained interest as a proportion of SPE assets.  That is, from the perspective of the 
SPE’s capital providers (who are principally lenders), the primary issue for them—assuming the 
existence of a fire wall between the SPE and the S-O that will prevent the S-O’s creditors from 
making claims on the SPE’s assets—is the extent to which the S-O will cover any shortfalls in 
the securitized assets’ contractual cash flows.  A relevant proxy for the S-O’s commitment to 
cover such shortfalls is the relative size of retained interest to SPE assets.  Unfortunately, the 
only measure of SPE assets available to us (and the market) is S-O managed assets, which likely 
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measure SPE assets with error.16  What is readily available to the market is the ratio of retained 
interest to S-O assets.  In addition, there reasons to expect this to be a good proxy measure that 
the market uses.  First, it is likely correlated with the unobservable ratio of retained interest to 
SPE assets (larger S-O firms tend to have more asset securitizations).  Second, the greater is the 
proportion of retained interest to S-O assets, the more important it is to the valuation of the S-O’s 
stock. 
4.4 Estimation separating regulated and non-regulated firms 
 As noted in section 3, relative to unregulated entities, regulated S-Os have additional 
incentives to engage in securitization transactions that are represented for accounting purposes as 
sales.  We therefore examine regulated and unregulated firms separately when addressing how 
the market views asset securitizations by estimating equation (3) separately for regulated and 
unregulated firms.  We define a firm as being regulated if it discloses in its footnotes that it has 
paid FDIC insurance.  This includes regulated financial institutions within the following three 
SIC categories: 6021, 6022, and 6036. 
5. Sample and Data  
5.1 Sample 
 We used the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system to search the 10-K forms of all firms filing with the 
SEC during the period December 2000 to January 2004 inclusive.  The choice of time period 
reflects the date after which SFAS 140 became effective, and hence the date after which the 
                                                 
16 Measurement error associated with using managed assets as proxy for SPE assets is likely to be a more serious 
problem when attempting to classify firms based on the ratio of retained interest to managed assets than when the 
level of managed assets is used as proxy for SPE assets in our valuation equations.  The reason is that whereas 
measurement error can lead to misclassification of high and low retained interest firms, it will only lead to a bias 
towards zero for the SPE asset and liability coefficients in the valuation equations. 
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securitization disclosure information needed to conduct the study became available.  We identify 
all firms who (a) are identified as S-Os by reason of having SFAS 140 disclosures, and (b) their 
SFAS 140 disclosures include the total principal amount of financial assets that the S-O manages 
as of fiscal year end that have previously been securitized.  This yields a sample of 297 firm year 
observations representing 112 firms.  When a sample firm does not disclose amounts for retained 
interest, servicing rights and gains on sale, we assume that these amounts are immaterial and set 
these variables to zero. 
 Because we estimate all regressions on a per share basis, all variables described below 
are deflated by common shares outstanding three months after year end (Compustat data item 
61).  Following common practice to ensure stock prices reflect information in financial 
statements, we define the dependent variable, MVE, as price three months after the year end (data 
item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding three months after year end (data item 61).  
We measure S-O total assets and liabilities, ASSET, and LIAB, as data items 6 and 181, and net 
income, NI, as data item 172.  The remaining variables, ADJ_ASSET, NEW_ASSET, 
SPE_ASSET, NEW_LIAB_HIGH, NEW_LIAB_LOW, and ADJ_NI, are as defined in the 
consolidation procedure section (section 5.2) and referenced in section 4.1. 
 Tables 1 and 2 present sample summary statistics and correlations for the variables used 
in equations (1), (2), and (3), together with the two variables used to construct some of the 
independent variables, retained interest (RET_INT) and servicing rights (MSR).  Table 1 indicates 
that consolidation of the S-O and SPE balance sheets has a substantial economic effect.  For 
example, mean (median) SPE assets and liabilities, SPE_ASSET and SPE_LIAB, are 46.44 and 
40.05 (9.67 and 8.32); mean (median).  Mean (median) S-O assets and liabilities, ASSET and 
LIAB, are 118.33 and 104.65 (98.25 and 80.15).  Therefore, consolidation increases mean 
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(median) total assets and liabilities, NEW_ASSET and NEWLIAB_LOW, of the combined entity 
to 158.38 and 144.70 (124.78 and 114.76).  Thus, in terms of means, consolidation increases 
total assets and liabilities by approximately 33%.  Table 1 also indicates that mean (median) 
retained interest, RET_INT, is 12.7% (9.5%) of mean (median) SPE assets, SPE_ASSET.  In 
addition, the ratio of RET_INT to SPE_ASSET exhibits wide cross-sectional variation. 
 Table 2 indicates that each of the asset and liability measures is highly correlated with 
each other and with stock price.  Interestingly, the bivariate correlation between stock price, 
MVE, and SPE_ASSET is negative, although this does not imply that the partial correlation 
between the two measures is negative. 
5.2 Consolidation Procedure17 
 We employ the following procedure to consolidate the activities of the SPE back into 
the financial statements of the sponsor firm.  First, we set the SPE assets equal to the off balance 
sheet portion of the managed portfolio of financial assets that are disclosed in the S-O’s financial 
statements.18  The SPE liability to third parties is more difficult to estimate as SFAS 140 requires 
no specific disclosures of the SPE’s outstanding liabilities.  However, it is possible to determine 
a possible range for the true liability.  At the highest end of the range, we set the SPE liability 
equal to the SPE asset.  The cash collections from these assets are used to repay the liability.  
Therefore, we assume that the liability can never be higher than the assets yet to be collected.  
This estimate of the SPE’s liability is likely overstated as securitizations are generally structured 
with retained interests.  As a result, the estimate would be overstated by the carrying amount of 
the retained interest.  Unfortunately, SFAS No. 140 only requires firms to disclose the fair value 
                                                 
17 We greatly appreciate discussions with Barbara Havlicek of Moodys about the best consolidation method. 
18 Ideally, we would obtain SPE asset and liability information directly from their financial statements.  
Unfortunately, these are not readily available.  Therefore, our procedure reflects an attempt to estimate SPE assets 
and liabilities from the S-O SFAS 140 disclosures.  It should also be noted that SFAS 140 disclosures do not include 
assets that had previously been securitized but the S-O no longer manages (see SFAS 140, footnote 10). 
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of the retained interest.  Therefore, a conservative estimate of the true liability to third parties is 
the SPE’s assets minus the sum of the fair value of the retained interest and the carrying value of 
any other related amounts on the sponsor’s balance sheet, i.e., servicing rights. 
Second, we adjust the S-O’s assets by removing fair value of the retained interests and 
any recognized servicing assets or liabilities from the balance sheet to state the S-O’s assets on 
an “as if” no sale had occurred basis.  We add our estimate of the SPE’s assets to this restated S-
O asset amount to obtain an estimate of the S-O’s total assets assuming that the SPE is 
consolidated with the S-O.  Similarly, we add our estimate of the SPE liability to the S-O’s 
liabilities to obtain an estimate of the consolidated liability.  Note, when we estimate equations 
(3) and (4), which include separately restated S-O assets and liabilities and SPE assets and 
liabilities, we cannot estimate the equations using the high liability estimate. This is because the 
SPE high liability, by construction, exactly equals SPE assets and therefore induces perfect 
collinearity in the regression.  We adjust current net income by subtracting current gains from 
securitizations transactions.19 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Specifications for Full Sample 
Table 3 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equation (1), 
the benchmark model before consolidation of the S-O and SPE balance sheets.20  Consistent with 
prior research and predictions, we cannot reject the null that 11 =a , 12 −=a , and 03 >a .  In 
                                                 
19 Note that our consolidation procedure is incomplete in that it is not possible from the SFAS 140 disclosures to 
discern the amount of interest receivable and payable from the securitized assets and liabilities.  However, servicing 
income paid by the SPE to the S-O likely approximates the difference between the two interest amounts. 
20 Untabulated findings from estimating equations (1) through (3) in ranks and using year fixed-effects indicate no 
changes in inferences from those relating to the tabulated findings. 
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particular, the respective untabulated t-statistics for the tests of 11 =a  and 12 −=a  are 0.49 and 
−0.85. 
Table 4 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equation (2), 
which includes total assets and liabilities on a post-consolidation basis.  Panel A (B) includes 
findings based on using NEW_LIAB_HIGH (NEW_LIAB_LOW) as the estimate of SPE total 
liabilities.  Although findings in both panels indicate that the total consolidated asset and liability 
coefficients have predicted signs, only the panel B findings are fully consistent with the 
prediction that the SPE’s assets and liabilities belong to the S-O.  In particular, whereas the 
untabulated t-statistics associated with panel A for the tests of 11 =a  and 12 −=a  are 8.26 and 
−9.44, the corresponding panel B t-statistics are 1.07 and −0.57.  In addition, whereas the model 
explanatory power in panel A, 46%, is substantially below that of the base model in table 3, 
59%, the model explanatory power in panel B, 56% is similar to that of the base model.  
Together, these two findings suggest that the more conservative liability measure for SPE 
liabilities is the more sensible one, which is fortuitous because that is the one we are limited to 
using in tests in which the S-O and SPE total assets and liabilities are included as separate 
regressors. 
Table 5 presents regression summary statistics associated with estimation of equation (3), 
which permits the coefficients on S-O total assets and liabilities and SPE total assets and 
liabilities to differ.  Findings indicate that the market views SPE assets and liabilities similarly to 
S-O assets and liabilities.  In particular, untabulated t-statistics associated with the test of the 
asset coefficients being equal to 1 and the liability coefficients being equal to −1 are each 
insignificant (the respective t-statistics for 11 =a , 12 −=a , 13 =a , 14 −=a  are 0.1, −0.66, 0.55, 
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and −0.62).  This finding indicates that SPE asset and liabilities are valued as belonging to the S-
O when S-O assets, liabilities, and net income are restated to reflect the effects of consolidation. 
These findings also are supported by the F-statistics associated with the test whether the 
market values S-O and SPE assets and liabilities similarly, i.e., as if 3a  = 1a and 4a  = 2a .  The F-
statistics, 1.00 and 3.02, are respectively insignificant and marginally significant (critical F at 5% 
level is 2.15).21  Taken together, the findings in table 5 suggest that when the S-O and SPE are 
consolidated, the evidence suggests that the market views the typical asset securitization as a 
loan, not as a sale. 
It is also interesting to note that the S-O asset and liability coefficients in table 5 are 
nearly identical to those in table 3.  Thus, adding SPE assets and liabilities to the equity valuation 
equation that already includes S-O assets and liabilities has little impact on the S-O asset and 
liability coefficients.  This finding suggests that although the market views SPE assets and 
liabilities as belonging to the S-O, it also views the activities of the SPE as being separable from 
those of the S-O.  This is not surprising given that only separable assets can be used as a basis for 
securitization. 
6.2 Randomization tests 
 Table 6 presents the findings from the bootstrapping procedure in which equation (3) is 
reestimated after scaled SPE assets and liabilities are randomly assigned from one S-O to another. 
We report the mean coefficients from the 1,000 estimations and the number of times 3a  and 4a , 
the SPE asset and liability coefficients, differ from zero.   
                                                 
21 The reason for rejecting 4a  = 2a  is that the SPE liability coefficient, −1.07, is even more negative than the S-O 
liability coefficient, −0.99. This result is consistent with SPE liability understating the true liability. 
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 The findings in table 6 indicate that randomly assigned SPE assets and liabilities are not 
valued as belonging to the recipient S-O.  Even though the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are 
significant, the economic magnitudes of the mean coefficients are essentially zero, 0.0001 and 
−0.0001, respectively, for SPE assets and liabilities.  In addition, the number of significant 
randomly assigned SPE asset and liability coefficients is approximately 14%.  The key 
conclusion to be drawn from table 6 is that randomly assigning SPE assets and liabilities from 
one S-O to another, adjusting for scale differences between the S-Os, indicates that scale is not a 
factor that can explain the findings in table 5.  This is additional evidence to support the 
conclusion that the market views SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O. 
6.3 Specifications for Retained Interest Partitionings 
 Table 7, panels A and B, presents findings associated with estimation of equation (3) for 
low and high retained interest subsamples.  If the market considers the degree of risk transfer to 
be different for high and low retained interest S-O firms, then SPE asset and liability coefficients 
for high retained interest S-O firms will be larger in absolute magnitude than will be those for 
low retained interest S-O firms.  In the extreme, if risk transfer is complete for low retained 
interest S-O firms, then their SPE asset and liability coefficients will be zero; if there is no risk 
transfer for high retained interest S-O firms, then their S-O and SPE asset and liability 
coefficients will be similar. 
 The findings in table 7 indicate that the market views high and low retained interest S-O 
firms differently.  In particular, whereas the market views asset securitizations by low retained 
interest S-O firms as sales, i.e., risk transfer has taken place, it views asset securitizations by high 
retained interest S-O firms as secured borrowings, i.e., risk transfer is incomplete.  For the low 
retained interest S-O firms, the SPE_ASSET and SPE_LIAB coefficients are insignificantly 
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different from zero (SPE_ASSET coefficient = −0.12 (t-statistic = −0.16), SPE_LIAB coefficient 
= 0.27 (t-statistic = 0.33)).  In contrast, the respective coefficients for the high retained interest S-
O firms are significantly positive and negative and similar in magnitude to the coefficients for 
the assets and liabilities of the S-O, ADJ_ASSET and LIAB (SPE_ASSET coefficient = 0.87 (t-
statistic = 6.08), SPE_LIAB coefficient = −0.88 (t-statistic = −6.08)).22 
 Untabulated findings indicate that retained interest varies systematically across S-O 
firms.   In particular, retained interest is lowest for multiple securitizers, and it varies by type of 
securitized asset, being lowest for mortgages and business receivables and highest for credit card 
receivables. These results are consistent with SPE bondholders seeking least assurance from S-O 
firms that repeatedly securitize their assets (the reputation effect) and for assets were the market 
is long-standing and highly active.  
6.4 Regulated and Unregulated firm estimations 
 The final set of analyses relate to partitioning the sample into regulated and unregulated 
firms.  Banks and other financial institutions subject to regulatory capital requirements have 
additional incentives to engage in asset securitizations for the purpose of managing income and 
regulatory capital.23  Under present international regulatory capital requirements, the equity 
tranche retained by the originating bank cannot be used to support any additional bank liabilities.  
That is, any retained interest held on the balance sheet attracts a dollar-for-dollar capital 
requirement.  This has purportedly led some banks to engage in off-balance sheet transactions to 
                                                 
22 We also used managed assets to partition the sample of S-O firms into high and low retained interest subsamples.  
Consistent with the concern we raise in section 4.3 regarding the potential effects of measurement error associated 
with using managed assets to measure the proportion of retained interest, findings from untabulated regressions 
indicate a general weakening of inferences. 
23 Although banking regulators generally acknowledge that securitization can be an important method for 
redistributing risks and diversifying portfolios, they are concerned that securitizations not be used as a means of 
circumventing capital requirement constraints (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2003).  To the extent 
that a dollar of assets removed by securitization transactions also removes a dollar of bank liabilities, the need for 
regulatory capital is reduced. 
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sell the equity tranche to a third party by means of a total returns swap (Wolfe, 2004).24  Relative 
to unregulated entities, regulated S-Os have additional incentives to engage in securitization 
transactions that are represented for accounting purposes as sales.  Therefore, as a final analysis, 
we reestimate equation (3) separately for regulated and unregulated firms to assess whether the 
market views asset securitizations differently for the two groups. 
 Table 8, panels A and B, presents findings for regulated and unregulated firms.  The 
findings in both panels indicate that the market views securitization transactions as secured 
borrowings rather than sales.  In particular, in both panels, the SPE asset and liability coefficients 
have predicted signs and have magnitudes that are significantly greater than zero.  The primary 
difference between the two sets of firms is that whereas all of the regulated firm asset and 
liability coefficients are well in excess of 1 and −1, the unregulated firm asset and liability 
coefficients are below 1 and −1, but closer to these predicted values.  Another notable difference 
is that the model explanatory power for regulated firms, 82%, is 70% larger than that for 
unregulated firm, 48%.  Taken together, these findings indicate that asset securitizations are 
valued by the market as if they are secured borrowings rather than sales, regardless of whether 
the S-Os are regulated or unregulated.  If anything, the evidence is stronger for regulated firms 
than for unregulated firms.  This is consistent with the notion that regulated firms have additional 
incentives to use a legal structure to remove debt from their balance sheets when economically 
they retain full property rights to the assets transferred to the SPE and obligations taken on by the 
SPE. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
24 Consistent with the prediction that regulated firms have the incentive to eliminate retained interest from the 
balance sheet, for our sample, untabulated findings indicate that, relative to regulated S-Os, unregulated S-Os have 
approximately ten times the amount of retained interest as a fraction of total assets. 
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The primary question this study addresses is whether asset securitizations are really asset 
sales or a form of secured borrowing.  We address this question by estimating cross-sectional 
equity valuation regressions to assess whether the stock market treats securitized assets and 
liabilities held by an SPE as assets and liabilities of the S-O.  We find that the market views the 
SPE assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O, i.e., the risk and rewards of ownership of the 
transferred assets reside with the S-O and not the SPE.  Results from a boot-strapping simulation 
that controls for scale by randomly assigning SPE assets and liabilities from one S-O to another 
provide evidence that scale bias is an unlikely explanation for finding the market views SPE 
assets and liabilities as belonging to the S-O.   
The second research question we address is whether the amount of retained interest 
arising from its securitization transactions affects the market’s perception of the degree to which 
risk has been transferred to the SPE.  We find that whereas the market views asset securitizations 
by low retained interest S-O firms as sales, i.e., risk transfer has taken place, it views asset 
securitizations by high retained interest S-O firms as secured borrowings, i.e., risk transfer is 
incomplete. 
We also find that although the market views securitizations by regulated and unregulated 
S-Os as secured borrowing, there is suggestive evidence that regulated firms have greater 
incentives to use securitizations to achieve off-balance sheet financing. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for 297 Sponsor Firm Observations 
 
All amounts are per share 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% Min. Max. 
        
MVE 27.15 22.125 20.38 11.90 39.71 0.035 104.00 
        
ASSET 118.33 98.25 103.35 35.26 176.41 1.92 526.93 
        
LIAB 104.65 80.15 99.16 21.69 163.22 1.43 483.43 
        
ADJ_ASSET 111.94 88.78 99.55 32.09 164.23 0.92 507.61 
        
NEW_ASSET 158.38 124.78 165.61 40.69 215.82 1.87 1,388.82 
        
NEW_LIAB_HIGH 151.09 117.74 180.70 29.81 202.10 1.85 1,618.04 
        
NEW_LIAB_LOW 144.70 114.76 162.74 27.39 200.45 1.53 1,374.55 
        
SPE_ASSET 46.44 9.67 131.24 3.15 35.73 0.01 1,238.91 
        
SPE_LIAB 40.05 8.32 110.95 2.41 28.44 -9.34 995.42 
        
NI 1.06 1.29 3.06 0.21 2.34 -22.65 12.77 
        
ADJ_NI -0.17 0.92 7.03 -0.15 2.12 -68.15 8.90 
        
RET_INT 5.08 0.92 18.81 0.26 3.49 -1.18 203.01 
        
MSR 1.31 0.00 6.76 0.00 0.17 -13.44 49.69 
        
 
Notes: 
MVE is defined as price 3 months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares 
outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61); ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB 
is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  ADJ_ASSET is defined as Asset less RET_INT and MSR; 
NEW_ASSET is defined as ADJ_ASSET plus SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_HIGH is defined as Liab plus 
SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_LOW is defined as LIAB plus SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_Asset is 
defined as managed loans off balance sheet disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as 
SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as 
NI less gains (losses) from current year securitization activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests 
from securitization transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights from securitization activities; Price is 
defined as price 3 months after the year end (data item 14). All variables are measured on a per share basis, 




Table 2  
Correlations 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. All variables are measured on a per share basis 
 
 MVE ASSET LIAB NEW_ASSET NEWLIAB_HIGH NEWLIAB_LOW ADJ_ASSET SPE_ASSET SPE_LIAB RET_INT MSR NI ADJ_NI 
MVE 
 
1.00 0.477 0.455 0.207 0.155 0.185 0.516 -0.130 -0.135 -0.150 0.112 0.525 0.269 
ASSET 
 
0.479 1.00 0.998 0.755 0.702 0.740 0.974 0.212 0.193 0.197 0.393 0.323 -0.120 
LIAB 
 
0.445 0.991 1.00 0.755 0.705 0.744 0.972 0.215 0.197 0.198 0.383 0.305 -0.126 
NEW_ASSET 
 
0.345 0.924 0.914 1.00 0.995 0.999 0.610 0.799 0.791 0.725 0.522 0.090 -0.609 
NEWLIAB_HIGH 
 
0.285 0.897 0.906 0.986 1.00 0.996 0.542 0.844 0.831 0.786 0.561 0.059 -0.671 
NEWLIAB_LOW 
 
0.302 0.907 0.916 0.988 0.998 1.00 0.595 0.810 0.802 0.733 0.515 0.073 -0.620 
ADJ_ASSET 
 
0.521 0.985 0.976 0.880 0.848 0.862 1.00 0.011 0.003 -0.023 0.232 0.347 0.080 
SPE_ASSET 
 
-0.174 0.282 0.290 0.527 0.577 0.553 0.207 1.00 0.995 0.932 0.483 -0.149 -0.829 
SPE_LIAB 
 
-0.166 0.271 0.280 0.518 0.564 0.545 0.200 0.983 1.00 0.898 0.413 -0.166 -0.797 
RET_INT 
 
-0.335 0.033 0.037 0.244 0.298 0.263 -0.054 0.719 0.629 1.00 0.574 -0.109 -0.870 
MSR 
 
0.116 0.460 0.476 0.436 0.454 0.453 0.429 0.212 0.173 0.101 1.00 0.126 -0.590 
NI 
 
0.685 0.467 0.450 0.409 0.391 0.392 0.464 0.024 0.013 -0.075 0.210 1.00 0.450 
ADJ_NI 
 
0.646 0.336 0.319 0.208 0.181 0.191 0.382 -0.213 -0.206 -0.292 0.046 0.831 1.00 
 
Notes: 
MVE is defined as price 3 months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61); ASSET is 
defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; 
NEW_ASSET is defined as ADJ_ASSET plus SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_HIGH is defined as LIAB plus SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_LOW is defined as LIAB plus 
SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_ASSET is defined as managed loans off balance sheet disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as 
SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as NI less gains (losses) from current year securitization 
activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests from securitization transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights from securitization activities. All variables 
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Table 3  
Base Model Regression 
OLS regressions of price on assets, liabilities and net income. T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. All variables are measured per share. Observations where Rstudent is larger 
than 2 in absolute value have been deleted. 
 
Model: ititititit eNIaLIABaASSETaaMVE ++++= 3210  
 
Intercept ASSET LIAB NI Adjusted R2 N 










      
      
 
Notes: 
ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 181 from Compustat; NI is 
defined as data item 172 from Compustat; MVE is defined as price 3 months after the year end (data item 
14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61).  All variables are 




Table 4  
SPE Assets and Liabilities Consolidated back into Sponsor 
OLS regressions of price on assets, liabilities and net income where SPE assets and 
liabilities are reconsolidated. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All variables are 
measured per share. Observations where Rstudent is larger than 2 in absolute value have 
been deleted. 
 
Model: ititititit eNIADJaLIABNEWaASSETSNEWaaMVE ++++= ___ 3210  
Panel A 
 
Intercept NEW_ASSETS NEW_LIAB_HIGH ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 










      





Intercept NEW_ASSETS NEW_LIAB_LOW ADJ_NI Adjusted R2 N 










      
      
 
Notes: 
ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  
ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; NEW_ASSET is defined as ADJ_ASSET plus 
SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_HIGH is defined as LIAB plus SPE_ASSET; NEW_LIAB_LOW is defined as 
LIAB plus SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_ASSET is defined as managed loans off balance sheet 
disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; NI is 
defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as NI less gains (losses) from current year 
securitization activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests from securitization transactions; MSR is 
defined as servicing rights from securitization activities; MVE is defined as price 3 months after the year 
end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61). All 
variables are measured on a per share basis, by deflating by common shares outstanding 3 months after year 




Table 5  
Sponsor’s Assets and Liabilities and SPE’s Assets and Liabilities 
OLS regressions of price on sponsors assets, liabilities, net income and SPE assets and 
liabilities. T-statistics are reported in brackets. All variables are measured per share. 
Observations where Rstudent is larger than 2 in absolute value have been deleted. 
 
Model: 
ititititititit eNIADJaLIABSPEaASSETSPEaLIABADJaASSETADJaaMVE ++++++= __  ___ 543210
 
Intercept ADJ_ASSET LIAB SPE_ASSET SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 














        
ADJ_ASSET = SPE_ASSET 1.00     
LIAB = SPE_LIAB 3.02     
        
 
Notes: 
ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  
ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_ASSET is defined as managed loans off 
balance sheet disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and 
MSR; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as NI less gains (losses) from 
current year securitization activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests from securitization 
transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights from securitization activities; MVE is defined as price 3 
months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after year end 
(data item 61). All variables are measured on a per share basis, by deflating by common shares outstanding 
3 months after year end (data item 61). 
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Table 6  
Randomization tests based on 1,000 independent regressions 
Summary statistics of OLS regressions of price on assets, liabilities, net income and 
random assignment of SPE assets and SPE liabilities. All random assignments of SPE 
assets and liabilities are scaled by relative magnitudes of “donor” and “recipient” S-O 
equity market values.  Fama McBeth t-statistics are reported in brackets. No. Significant 
obs. refers to the number of times the variable was significant (at a p-value of 0.05 or 
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 ADJ_ASSET LIAB SPE_ASSET SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI 














  142 146  
Notes: 
MVE is defined as price 3 months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares 
outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61); ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB 
is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; 
SPE_ASSET is defined as managed loans off balance sheet randomly assigned; SPE_LIAB is defined as 
SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and MSR randomly assigned; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; 
ADJ_NI is defined as NI less randomly assigned gains (losses) from current year securitization activities; 
RET_INT is defined as retained interests from securitization transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights 
from securitization activities. All variables are measured on a per share basis, by deflating by common 
shares outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61). 
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Table 7 
Sponsor’s Assets and Liabilities and SPE’s Assets and Liabilities Ranked on Retained 
Interest 
OLS regressions of price on sponsors assets, liabilities, net income and SPE assets and 
liabilities. T-statistics are in brackets. All variables are measured per share. Panel A 
(Panel B) contains observations with ranked below (above) the median of Retained 
Interest/Asset. Observations where Rstudent is larger than 2 in absolute value have been 
deleted prior to ranking the data. 
 
Model: 
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Panel A Low Retained Interest / Asset  
 
Intercept ADJ_ASSET LIAB SPE_ASSET SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 














        
 
 
Panel B High Retained Interest / Asset  
 
Intercept ADJ_ASSET LIAB SPE_ASSET SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 














        
 Notes: 
ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 181 from Compustat;  
ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_ASSET is defined as managed loans off 
balance sheet disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as SPE_ASSET less RET_INT and 
MSR; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as NI less gains (losses) from 
current year securitization activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests from securitization 
transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights from securitization activities; MVE is defined as price 3 
months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after year end 
(data item 61). All variables are measured on a per share basis, by deflating by common shares outstanding 
3 months after year end (data item 61). 
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Table 8  
Regulated versus Unregulated 
OLS regressions of price on sponsor’s assets, liabilities, net income and SPE’s assets and 
liabilities. T-statistics are in brackets. All variables are measured per share. Observations 
where Rstudent is larger than 2 in absolute value have been deleted. 
 
Model: 
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Panel A Regulated 
 
 
Intercept ADJ_ASSET LIAB SPE_ASSE
T 
SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 
























SPE_LIAB ADJ_NI Adjusted 
R2 
N 
















A sponsor firm is classified as Regulated if its primary SIC is either 6021, 6022, or 6036; all other firms are 
classified as Unregulated.  ASSET is defined as data item 6 from Compustat; LIAB is defined as data item 
181 from Compustat;  ADJ_ASSET is defined as ASSET less RET_INT and MSR; SPE_ASSET is defined as 
managed loans off balance sheet disclosed in the financial statements; SPE_LIAB is defined as SPE_ASSET 
less RET_INT and MSR; NI is defined as data item 172 from Compustat; ADJ_NI is defined as NI less gains 
(losses) from current year securitization activities; RET_INT is defined as retained interests from 
securitization transactions; MSR is defined as servicing rights from securitization activities; MVE defined as 
price 3 months after the year end (data item 14) multiplied by common shares outstanding 3 months after 
year end (data item 61).  All variables are measured on a per share basis, by deflating by common shares 
outstanding 3 months after year end (data item 61). 
 
